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6Introduction
At the end of May, Europeans will elect a new Euro-
pean Parliament and soon after a new European Commis-
sion will begin its five-year mandate. The political chang-
ing of the guard in the European Union (EU) comes at a 
time of economic recovery: per capita income has been 
growing by about two percent annually for the last three 
years, and growth has recently returned to every EU mem-
ber state. Unemployment has been falling across the EU 
in the last year and now stands at an average of 6.7 per- 
cent – marking a new all-time low. It seems that Europe 
is doing well: the economic tide is rising and, for the first 
time since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 
2008, all boats are lifting. 
Getting to grips with social conditions  
across the EU
Yet, when we start digging deeper to understand how Euro-
peans are experiencing the social and economic progress 
that the headline figures suggest, the picture blurs. There 
are great differences in social conditions across EU coun-
tries and regions, and the global economic and finan-
cial crisis, which led to a double-dip recession in the EU 
between 2008 and 2013, has in many areas added to the 
disparities within and between European societies. These 
ruptures in the social fabric across Europe become particu-
larly apparent if one looks beyond aggregate economic and 
labour market figures and takes into account other factors 
that determine the quality of living and working in Europe: 
the availability and quality of work, gender equality, access 
to services such as healthcare, or the chance to live and 
work anywhere in the EU. 
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Concern about social imbalances is also reflected in Euro-
peans’ views: When asked by a 2017 Eurobarometer sur-
vey about the most important challenges for the EU at 
large, social issues such as unemployment and inequal-
ity rank highest among European citizens – before migra-
tion, security, public debt, and low growth.1 These concerns 
are not confined to poorer member states: According to the 
survey, 50 percent of Germans and 46 percent of Swedes 
considered social inequalities as among the most pressing 
challenges in Europe. Moreover, only one in two Europe-
ans agrees with the statement that everyone in their coun-
try has a chance to succeed in life. And 84 percent of Euro-
peans think that income differences in their country are 
too great.2 Hence, despite visible economic progress, a large 
majority of Europeans worries about social cohesion in 
their own country and in Europe.
This observation is the starting point of our report. We 
set out to get a better understanding of social conditions 
across the EU. The report has three aims: First, we provide 
new – and perhaps surprising – perspectives on well-
known social challenges in Europe. Second, we zoom in 
on concrete examples of living and working conditions to 
illustrate how they directly impact upon Europeans’ daily 
lives. Third, drawing on many case studies collected across 
different countries and regions, we provide a nuanced por-
trait of the – often very disparate – social conditions across 
the EU today. 
 
1 Eurobarometer, 2017, Future of Europe – Social Issues, Special  
Eurobarometer 467.
2 Eurobarometer, 2018, Fairness, inequality and intergenerational mobility, 
Special Eurobarometer 471.
7• Obstacles to free movement: Even though free move-
ment is a cornerstone of European integration, mobile 
EU citizens still face various obstacles when deciding to 
live and work in another EU member state. We focus on 
the challenges they encounter when integrating into the 
job market, in particular with regard to the recognition 
of their qualifications and to over-qualification.
• Gender inequalities: To understand how gender imbal-
ances accumulate over time, we adopt a lifetime per-
spective and follow European women through differ-
ent stages of their (working) lives: from education and 
career opportunities, reconciliation of working and care 
obligations right until their retirement. We illustrate 
persistent inequalities that half of Europe’s population is 
confronted with and how these, finally, also build up to a 
large pension gap.
• Poverty: Almost a quarter of Europe’s population – or 
some 113 million Europeans – lives at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion. This has not only negative implica-
tions for their living standards but also for social inte-
gration, especially the life chances of children. We show 
what kind of challenges materially deprived Europeans 
have to deal with. 
• Access to healthcare: Having access to healthcare is 
essential for people’s quality of life. We focus on three 
aspects that can pose significant barriers to health-
care access: we start with a look at how different income 
levels can affect one’s ability to afford healthcare, for 
example through high out-of-pocket payments. We con-
tinue with coverage for healthcare and zoom in on the 
situation in Greece during the economic crisis. We con-
clude with regional imbalances in healthcare provision.
Putting social imbalances at the heart of the 
European debate
The report is entitled “How are you doing Europe?”. We 
did not set out to find a definite answer to this question 
but rather wanted to focus on the well-being of individual 
Europeans and their communities. Whether Europeans are 
doing well in their daily lives depends very much on which 
country or region they live in, which socio-economic group 
Focus on six pressing social challenges
There is a range of ways of investigating social condi-
tions in Europe. The starting point of our own research is 
an assessment of current sets of indicators tracking differ-
ent aspects of Europe’s social fabric. This report, however, 
is not designed to give a comprehensive overview. Monitor-
ing reports and quantitative research papers by institutions 
such as the European Commission, Eurofound, Eurostat or 
the OECD are excellent places to look for such systematic 
accounts. To give one prominent example, the Social Score-
board as part of the recently proclaimed European Pillar of 
Social Rights covers twelve areas clustered in three dimen-
sions, including gender equality, poverty, youth, employ-
ment, early childhood care, and healthcare.3 
Our report follows a different approach. We selected six social 
challenges (or “dossiers”) based on whether they are rele-
vant for a large number of Europeans across different mem-
ber states and regions and whether they have a direct impact 
that people may experience in their daily lives. We draw both 
on the afore-mentioned sets of indicators and monitor-
ing reports, as well as on a broad range of case studies that 
allow us to better understand the context in which different 
socio-economic groups across Europe are affected. 
Each of the six dossiers provides a nuanced portrait of a 
European social challenge: 
• Employment and joblessness: Despite the current labour 
market recovery, unemployment during the recent eco-
nomic crisis might have inflicted lasting damage on the 
lives and careers of those affected. We shed light on the 
many different forms of joblessness, including the often 
overlooked and disparate group of the economically inac-
tive. We also highlight the detrimental effects of long-
term unemployment on mental health. 
• Precarious work: Decent working conditions and a job 
that provides economic security is pivotal to individual 
well-being. Many Europeans work, however, under pre-
carious conditions. We explore what this means using 
examples such as the rise in temporary contracts for 
young employees or scant social protection and career 
opportunities for certain groups of self-employed.
3 European Commission, Social Scoreboard.
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8they belong to, and on the precise aspect of living and 
working conditions under examination. By shedding light 
on these aspects, we hope to contribute to the debate on 
how Europe is doing – and what is needed to make Europe-
ans better off. The upcoming election of the European Par-
liament provides an excellent opportunity to put the ques-
tion of what to do about social imbalances at the heart of a 
genuinely European debate.
Introduction
9Recent developments on the European labour market have 
been overwhelmingly positive: The employment rate has 
reached an historic high and, at 73.2 percent by the second 
quarter of 2018, is finally closing in on the long-term EU 
2020 employment target of 75 percent of the labour force 
(20 to 64 year-olds). EU-wide unemployment declined to 
6.9 percent, only slightly above the pre-crisis level of 2008. 
And youth unemployment has fallen four percentage points 
in just two years – now down to 15 percent across the EU.4 
Looking behind the headline figures, it is important to note 
that the crisis has left the labour market with large dispar-
ities both between countries and between socio-economic 
groups. Moreover, the remaining 17 million unemployed 
Europeans are not only a heterogeneous group, but they are 
also not the only people out of work. In this dossier, we will 
focus in particular on the inactive people who would like to 
work and on the long-term unemployed across Europe.
4 European Commission, 2018, Employment and Social Development in 
Europe - Quarterly Review – December 2018, Publications Office of the 
European Union, Luxembourg.
Employment:  
An uneven European recovery 
A jobs-rich recovery for all? 
Three questions are particularly important in order to 
assess the quality of the labour market recovery in the EU 
since the crisis: Has recovery reached people in all mem-
ber states? Which groups have benefitted from it and which 
did not? And how much slack is there still in the European 
labour market? 
Since 2013 employment has increased in all member states. 
Most notably, employment levels have increased in Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) member states5 and in those 
crisis-stricken countries that have experienced a strong 
recovery such as Portugal or Spain that were emerging 
from a deep trough. However, the rise in average employ-
ment beyond pre-crisis levels is mostly driven by job-cre-
ation in just two countries: Germany and the United King-
dom (UK) together have added about eight million jobs 
5 In this paper, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) refers to Bulgaria, Croatia, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia.
Did you know that …
 … between 2013 and 2017, 12.1 million additional jobs were created in the EU? At the same time the number of  
unemployed people declined by just 7.4 million. This is because many inactive people also got into work.
 … by mid-2018, unemployment in the EU had declined to 6.9 percent, close to pre-crisis levels? Yet if one adds discouraged job 
seekers and underemployed workers, the rate increases to 14.3 percent.
 … while not counting towards official (un)employment figures, many inactive people are unhappy with their situation?  
Four out of five inactive people in the EU would like to work at least a few hours a week.
 … in 2017, the number of long-term unemployed was still 36 percent above 2008 levels? In eight EU countries it was still more 
than twice as high. Germany is the only Eurozone country where long-term unemployment has fallen below 2008 levels.
Employment: An uneven European recovery 
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since 2008. By contrast, in ten EU countries employment 
levels are still below 2008 figures (see graph). 
The labour market rebound after the crisis has largely ben-
efitted from increasing activity on the part of two groups 
with traditionally below-average employment: women 
and people aged 55 to 64. The employment rate of women 
rose from 62.8 to 66.5 percent between 2008 and 2017. The 
increase was even bigger for older people, climbing from 
45.5 to 57.1 percent. Other “outsider” groups such as young 
adults aged 20 to 29, non-EU migrants and people with 
lower education levels have not experienced a comparable 
recovery: their EU-wide employment levels have decreased 
compared to pre-crisis periods.6 Men – who traditionally 
have above-average levels of employment – have not added 
to the increase, and it was only in 2017 that their levels of 
employment returned to those of 2008.
The average weekly working time of Europeans decreased 
by about one hour between 2008 and 2013 and has not 
increased since. While many factors such as a shift towards 
part-time and service sector employment are at play here, 
this development also points to the significant slack that 
still exists in the labour market. In fact, when includ-
ing other measures of slack such as the proportion of peo-
ple who would like to work more hours (underemployed) 
and discouraged workers who are available but not actively 
seeking work (inactive), the combined rate of unem-
ployed, underemployed and discouraged workers doubles to 
14.3 percent of the European labour force.7 
Many ways of being out of work
When thinking about joblessness, we usually have a binary 
view: either somebody is employed or they are unemployed. 
Yet this does not cover the wide spectrum of different kinds 
of joblessness that can have a great variety of short- and 
long-term impact on those affected. Two groups of jobless 
people deserve particular attention: the long-term unem-
ployed who have been out of work for more than a year and 
6 Eurostat, 2018, Smarter, greener, more inclusive? Indicators to support the 
Europe 2020 strategy. 2018 edition, Publications Office of the European 
Union, Luxembourg.
7 European Commission, 2018, Employment and Social Development in 
Europe - Quarterly Review – December 2018, Publications Office of the 
European Union, Luxembourg.
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inactive people who are not actively looking but ready and 
willing to work. Long-term unemployment is particularly 
detrimental for the individual both in terms of well-be-
ing and life chances, and the unwillingly inactive are easily 
overlooked when trying to get jobless people back into work. 
Before the crisis, inactivity was, by and large, falling across 
the EU. During the crisis, however, the number of inactive 
people who were willing to work increased considerably, as 
more and more were discouraged by the scarcity of jobs to 
actively search for employment (see figure). Even now, the 
group of inactive who would like to work remains substan-
tial in several member states, for example in Italy, where 
they account for about a third of the economically inactive 
(see figure on page 12). 
Inactive people are a very diverse group with vastly differ-
ent living conditions and varying reasons for being inac-
tive. They include homemakers, early retirees, people with 
disabilities, or discouraged workers. Because they are usu-
ally not registered with their local employment services, 
it is much harder to reach them with employment poli-
cies such as advisory services or training. Despite the fact 
that they are not actively looking for a job, four out of five 
inactive Europeans would in fact like to work at least sev-
eral hours a week. And about two in five would even like to 
work 32 hours or more. The willingness to work is particu-
larly strong among homemakers and students.8 We illus-
trate some of the employment barriers that these groups 
face below.  
Zooming in: Different faces of joblessness in Italy
In the OECD project “Faces of Joblessness,” the authors used a 
segmentation method to identify distinct groups with similar pro-
files of employment barriers across EU countries.9 In Italy, the 
group of jobless and underemployed people makes up 40 percent 
of the working age population. In the following, we present six out 
of 13  identified subgroups that differ with respect to age, gender, 
education and skills as well as previous experience and alternative 
8 Eurofound, 2017, Reactivate: Employment opportunities for economically 
inactive people, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
9 Rodrigo Fernandez, et al., 2016, Faces of Joblessness: Characterising 
Employment Barriers to Inform Policy, OECD Social, Employment and 
Migration Working Papers, No. 192, OECD Publishing, Paris.
sources of income.10 These differences result in specific combina-
tions of employment barriers. 
The two largest subgroups in Italy are inactive women in their fif-
ties whose barriers to employment lie in their lack of sufficient 
work experience. The first subgroup is comparatively better off: 
these women have a relatively low level of education but at least 
some work experience. They can also draw on other income from 
fellow household members. By contrast, the second group has 
no work experience, has very low educational and skill levels and 
lives in much poorer households. 
Another subgroup (the fifth largest) is comprised of long-term 
unemployed males in their late forties whose main barriers to 
work are a lack of job opportunities but also low educational 
attainment and low professional skills. This group is at the high-
est risk of poverty among all groups. A second male subgroup of 
jobless Italians is in their late fifties and has a significantly higher 
10 James Browne and Daniele Pacifico, 2016, Faces of Joblessness in Italy: 
Anatomy of Employment Barriers, OECD.
Economic inactivity: Overall declining – but share of 
those willing to work has increased
Inactive population by willingness to work,  
in million of EU working-age population 
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Time matters: Consequences of long-term 
unemployment
Long-term unemployment picked up sharply during the cri-
sis in some EU member states: In Spain it rose from 13 to 
50  percent of total unemployment between 2008 and 2015. 
In Italy, long-term unemployment climbed to 69 percent of 
all unemployed in 2013. EU countries hit hardest by the cri-
sis faced a dual problem: high unemployment and increasing 
proportions of long-term unemployed. As a consequence, 
the lasting detrimental effects of long-term unemploy-
ment reach deep into the labour force to hit socio-eco-
income (third quintile). Most people in this group are inactive and 
receive relatively high earnings replacement benefits, with over 
60 percent receiving old-age benefits. What keeps them from 
working is a low level of educational attainment as well as rela-
tively high benefits compared to what they could earn.
Two other sub-groups include discouraged young people who have 
looked for work for an extended period of time without success and 
have finally turned inactive. The larger sub-group is on average 32 
years old. For them, sporadic and irregular work experience is the 
main barrier to employment, followed by a lack of job offers and, in 
some cases, poor education. The second group of young jobless Ital-
ians is on average 27 years old. Their main problem is also a lack of 
experience and opportunities. They are better educated than the 
previous group but have no paid work experience so far.
Joblessness: Composition and change in Germany, France, Italy and Spain
Note: Working-age population refers to the age group 20 to 64 years. 
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC survey.
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nomic groups that are normally less affected, such as young 
job-seekers and medium- or high-skilled workers.11 
Along with a rise in youth unemployment, long-term 
unemployment among young people aged between 15 and 
24 reached 8.1 percent in 2013. This peak in long-term 
unemployment rates was significantly higher than the 
5.1 percent in the EU labour force as a whole. The damage 
of long-term unemployment on young Europeans lasts 
beyond the immediate crisis: Even if its effects on active 
labour market participation dissipates over time, those 
affected are more likely to be employed below their level of 
skills, and their lifelong earnings will be hit.
During the extended periods of unemployment, job seek-
ers suffer from skills deprivation and a deterioration in 
psychological well-being. The experience of long spells of 
unemployment is particularly detrimental to young peo-
ple’s well-being. A study by Eurofound on the effects of 
the recent economic crisis has found that young long-
term unemployed Europeans were considerably less sat-
isfied with their life, less optimistic about the future and 
perceived themselves more likely to be socially excluded 
than the short-term unemployed, employed or students.12 
Most striking were the negative effects on psychologi-
cal well-being as measured in the European Quality of Life 
Survey: While students, employed and short-term unem-
ployed people reached scores of 69 or 70 out of 100 on the 
Mental Well-being Index, long-term unemployed young 
people only scored 60.13 
11 See for example Werner Eichorst, et al., 2015, A European Perspective on 
Long-term unemployment, IZA Discussion Paper No. 9321; Nicole Duell,  
et al., 2016, Long-term unemployment in the EU: Trends and Policies,  
Bertelsmann Stiftung.
12 Eurofound, 2017, Long-term unemployed youth: Characteristics and policy 
responses, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
13 Ibid. The figures are taken from an updated version of the study in Euro-
found, 2018, Living and working in Europe 2017, Publications Office of the 
European Union, Luxembourg.
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Overall employment in the EU has been rising since 2013. 
Yet many observers worry that many of these new jobs 
come with less job security, poorer working conditions and 
lower earnings and benefits. In short, the fear is that the 
current recovery is taking place at the expense of a rise in 
precarious employment.
Many people associate precarious employment with tempo-
rary contracts or part-time work. Taking a more compre-
hensive approach, precarious employment includes three 
dimensions: insecure employment like fixed-term con-
tracts; lack of social protection or an unsupportive envi-
ronment such as a lack of training opportunities; and vul-
nerable employees who live under economic strain with no 
financial buffers.14
To get an idea of what precarious employment means for 
European workers, we illustrate each of these three dimen-
14 Martin Olsthoorn, 2014, Measuring Precarious Employment: A Proposal for 
Two Indicators of Precarious Employment Based on Set-Theory and Tested 
with Dutch Labor Market-Data, Social Indicators Research, 119(1).
Precarious work: More jobs in Europe of less quality?
sions with an example: We look at the use of fixed-term 
contracts among young employees, investigate the social 
security position of the self-employed and show that work 
is not always a protection against poverty. 
Young Europeans stuck with temporary 
employment
Across the EU, about one in four part-time workers and 
every second employee with a temporary contract stated in 
2017 that they would prefer – but could not find – a stand-
ard job. While non-standard employment does not auto-
matically imply precarious employment, involuntary 
non-standard employment indicates that employees are 
looking for higher job protection and higher incomes by 
working more. 
Young people are particularly affected by insecure employ-
ment, especially in form of temporary contracts. While 
only 14 percent of the working population in the EU held 
Precarious work:  
More jobs in Europe of less quality?
Did you know that …
 … about one in ten workers in Europe lives below the poverty line? In-work poverty has increased continuously since 2005.  
Young people and workers in atypical jobs are most likely to be affected.
 … for almost half of the 32 million self-employed Europeans, sickness would constitute a risk to their financial security?
 … in 2017, about one in four part-time workers and every second employee with a temporary contract wanted to –  
but could not find – a full-time or permanent position?
 … while only 14 percent of employees in the EU have a temporary contract, this number climbs to 44 percent among young people?
 … in France, around 4.5 million very short fixed-term contracts are signed each quarter – many of them for no longer than  
a week, with the same person rehired again and again?
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non-permanent contracts in 2017, among 15 to 24 year-old 
employees the level is as high as 44 percent – and the trend 
points upward. 
During the economic crisis, many EU member states 
relaxed restrictions on the use of temporary contracts to 
provide employers with more flexibility as a means to com-
bat unemployment: examples are Greece, the Netherlands, 
Poland or Spain.15 Yet when fixed-term contracts become 
the norm for young employees, it weakens their bargaining 
power and may push down their wages as illustrated in the 
example from France below.
What is more, research suggests that fixed-term contracts 
have lost some of their ability to serve as stepping-stones 
to permanent employment. Between 2008 and 2014 tran-
sition rates from temporary to permanent positions 
decreased in a majority of member states, while transitions 
from temporary positions into unemployment increased.16 
Yet it should be noted that both the share of temporary 
employment and transition rates differ widely. In Spain 
and Poland, for example, the proportion of temporary con-
tracts is above 20 percent, while in the UK only five per-
cent of employees have temporary contracts. Correspond-
ingly, transition rates to permanent positions are relatively 
low in Spain and Poland, while they are comparably high in 
the United Kingdom.17 
Zooming in: Ultra-short contracts in France
The French labour market, known for its strong employment pro-
tection for standard jobs, has become increasingly polarized: while 
a (generally older) core workforce remains well protected, young 
people in particular are left with insecure short-term employ-
ment.18 In 2017, 58 percent of French employees aged between 
15 and 24 held a temporary contract, a so-called contrat de travail 
à durée déterminée (CDD). This is more than three times the French 
15 Jill Rubery and Agnieszka Piasna, 2016, Labour market segmentation and 
EU reform agenda, European Trade Union Institute.
16 European Commission, 2016, Temporary employment in the EU: spring-
boards or career dead ends?
17 Andrea Broughton, 2016, Precarious employment in Europe, Study prepared 
for the European Parliament; Eurofound, 2017, Employment transitions and 
occupational mobility in Europe: The impact of the Great Recession, Publi-
cations Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
18 See for example Jean Tirole, 2017, Economics for the Common Good, 
Princeton University Press.
average (17 percent). The proportion of young people on CDDs 
picked up sharply in the 1990s and has increased gradually ever 
since. Particularly problematic is the rise in very short-term CDDs 
of less than one month since the early 2000s: The number of very 
short-term CDDs rose from about 1.6 million per quarter in 2003 
to almost 4.5 million in 2017 (see figure on page 16). 
According to a new study by Philippe Askenazy and Bruno Pal-
ier, contracts lasting less than a week have become particularly 
popular in recent years.19 Although there are restrictions on their 
consecutive use, employers can circumvent these by employing a 
person for four days a week, then applying a transition period (at 
least half of the duration time) and re-hiring the same person for 
four days the following week. Ultra-short CDDs allow employers 
to push down labour costs because workers receive no paid vaca-
tion, no performance pay and generate no dismissal costs. Fur-
thermore, CDD workers usually fall below the minimal tenure for 
benefiting from mandatory profit sharing. This practice of rehir-
ing ultra-short-term workers was applied to 80 percent of “new” 
CDD recruits in 2015.  
Be your own boss: For many Europeans  
a burden not a blessing
Around 32 million people in Europe are self-employed, 
accounting for around 15 percent of the EU working popu-
lation. Many self-employed people are well off, in particu-
lar those who have employees and freelancers with high 
and stable incomes. Yet only 54 percent of self-employed 
people without employees say that becoming their own 
boss was a decision based on their own preferences, and 
24 percent say they had no alternative.20
In a recent study, Eurofound clustered the self-employed into 
five groups: Employers, stable own-account workers, small 
traders and farmers, vulnerable and concealed self-em-
ployed.21 While the first two groups, making up roughly half 
of all self-employed, can reap the benefits of being their own 
boss, the vulnerable (5.4 million, 17 percent of all self-em-
ployed) and the hidden self-employed (2.6  million, eight 
19 Philippe Askenazy and Bruno Palier, 2018, France: rising precariousness 
supported by the welfare state, CEPREMAP Docweb No. 1801.
20 Data from the European Working Conditions Survey 2015.
21 Eurofound, 2017, Exploring the self-employed in the European Union,  
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
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percent) are less autonomous and often lack essential social 
security as well as opportunities for training or career pro-
gress. In addition, they often live with a high degree of 
financial uncertainty (see figure on page 17). 
Vulnerable self-employed workers generally have low wages 
and poor social security: 55 percent of this group depend on 
one client and more than three quarters work alone. About 
80 percent of vulnerable self-employed can be found in the 
bottom 40 percent of the income distribution, and more 
than half would face financial insecurity in case of sickness. 
The group of vulnerable self-employed is most prevalent in 
Central and Eastern Europe, especially in Romania, Croa-
tia and the Baltic states. Among this group, five out of the 
ten most common occupations are in the agricultural sector, 
comprising about a quarter of all jobs. Other common occu-
pations in this group are cleaners or care workers.
The working conditions of the hidden self-employed are 
very much like those of employees, with regular pay and 
working hours and a low degree of autonomy at work. Yet 
similar to the vulnerable group of self-employed, their 
social security is weak and 60 percent of these self-em-
ployed would have financial difficulties in the case of sick-
ness. Concealed self-employment is most prevalent in the 
UK and Slovakia, followed by Germany, Poland and the Bal-
tic states. Typical jobs are in the construction and manu-
facturing sector as well as being a taxi driver. 
Concealed self-employment is often in conflict with the 
law, as there is a legal distinction between employment and 
self-employment to protect de facto employees from losing 
employment protection, access to social security as well as 
health and safety protection. Especially in the construction 
sector fraudulent or “bogus” self-employment is wide-
spread.22
22 Yves Jorens, 2008, Self-employment and bogus self-employment in the 
European construction industry. 
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a strong boom, with falling unemployment and rising wages 
in the past decade, yet has seen one of the most significant 
increases in workers at risk of poverty.23 Several CEE coun-
tries also saw the share of working poor increasing against 
the backdrop of a significant rise in average incomes. 
Levels of in-work poverty also vary strongly between differ-
ent types of employment. The lowest risk of in-work pov-
erty is found among employees with a permanent job. By 
contrast, workers in atypical employment and young work-
ers have an elevated risk of being among the working poor 
(see figure on page 18). In-work poverty has also increased 
most markedly in these groups compared to 2005. 
23 Dorothee Spannagel et al., 2017, Aktivierungspolitik und Erwerbsarmut,  
WSI Report Nr. 36, Juli 2017.
In-work poverty: A problem for  
non-standard jobs
Employment is often seen as the main escape-route from 
poverty. Nevertheless, a considerable share of the work-
ing population falls below the at-risk-of-poverty thresh-
old that stands at 60 percent of national median income. 
This so-called in-work poverty increased consistently since 
the mid-2000s, from an EU average of 8.2 percent of the 
employed population in 2005 to 9.6 percent in 2017. 
Crucially, this rise is not limited to a specific group of coun-
tries. In crisis countries like Italy, Spain or Greece in-work 
poverty climbed during a downturn with rising unemploy-
ment and falling wages. Germany, however, has experienced 
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Free to move? Remaining barriers to mobile citizens in the EU
Free movement of workers is one of the cornerstones of EU 
integration and an essential ingredient for a functioning 
internal market. Allowing European citizens to move and 
reside freely across the EU gives them the chance to strive 
for opportunities not only at home, but across the EU in 
places where their skills might be more in demand or com-
mand better pay. At roughly four percent of the EU working 
age population in 2017, mobile EU citizens living in another 
EU member state represent a small but steadily growing 
proportion.24 Brexit and debates such as on the posting of 
workers across the EU have propelled the topic of mobil-
ity back under the spotlight. Yet approval of free move-
ment remains consistently high across the EU: according to 
a Eurobarometer survey, 83 percent of Europeans supported 
free movement of people in the EU in 2018.25 
24 Eurostat, 2018, EU citizens living in another Member State – statistical 
overview.
25 European Commission, 2018, Public opinion in the European Union,  
Standard Eurobarometer 90.
We put the emphasis on intra-EU mobility as means of 
enhancing labour market participation and life opportuni-
ties: We first look at who moves across EU borders and for 
what reason. Subsequently, we identify obstacles EU mobile 
citizens encounter when intending to work abroad and 
focus on issues with regard to recognition of qualifications. 
Furthermore, we look at a problem that can occur while 
working abroad: over-qualification. We conclude by zoom-
ing in on the labour market integration of young mobile EU 
citizens in the UK.
Who is on the move in the EU …
The proportion of EU citizens living abroad differs signif-
icantly between member states. While only one percent 
of the German population of working age (20 to 64 years) 
lived in another EU country in 2016, this was the case for 
Free to move? Remaining obstacles  
to mobile citizens in the EU
Did you know that …
 … in 2017, roughly four percent of Europeans of working age lived in another EU country? 
 … while one percent of Germany’s working age population lived abroad, almost a fifth of the Romanian working  
age population did so? 
 … the employment rate of Europeans living in another EU country, at 76.1 percent, is on average four percentage points higher 
than for the EU population as a whole? 
 … a large share of mobile citizens living in the main destination countries, such as Germany or the UK,  
went abroad in order to take up a job or to look for work abroad? 
 … mobile citizens from member states that joined the EU since 2004 are more likely to feel overqualified than movers from other 
EU countries?
 … the proportion of tertiary graduates among mobile EU citizens of working age has increased to 32.4 percent and is higher  
than the EU average?
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almost one in five Romanians.26 The economic crisis led to 
the numbers of Greeks and Spaniards leaving their home 
country more than doubling between 2007 and 2011. Yet 
Europeans moving from Eastern to Western Europe still 
outnumber by far those moving from South to North.27 
A majority of EU movers – three quarters – is of work-
ing age, and they are typically working: On average, their 
employment rate is, at 76.1 percent, four percentage points 
higher than the EU average. A third of mobile EU citizens 
have tertiary education, while a quarter are low-skilled. Of 
those who moved to another member state during the last 
ten years, women had the highest share of higher educa-
26 Eurostat, 2018, EU citizens living in another Member State – statistical 
overview.
27 Eurofound, 2014, Labour mobility in the EU: Recent trends and policies, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
Who moves: EU citizens living in another member state than their own
Note: EU citizens of working age (20-64 years) as percent of the total population in countries of destination (right map);  
as percent of their home-country resident population (left map); country of citizenship: low reliability for Luxembourg. 
Source: Eurostat, 2018, EU citizens living in another Member State – statistical overview (left map);  
Elena Fries-Tersch et al., 2018, 2017 Annual Report on intra-EU Labour Mobility (right map). 
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Where do they come from … (2017, in percent)
tion, while low educational attainment was highest among 
men.28 
… and why are Europeans moving across 
borders?
The two most important destination countries for mobile 
citizens are Germany and the UK: almost half of all  EU 
movers live here.29 Eurostat data from 2014 shows that a 
28 Elena Fries-Tersch et al., 2018, 2017 Annual Report on intra-EU Labour 
Mobility, prepared for the European Commission, Publications Office of the 
European Union, Luxembourg ; Eurostat, 2018, EU citizens living in another 
Member State – statistical overview.
29 Elena Fries-Tersch et al., 2018, 2017 Annual Report on intra-EU Labour 
Mobility, prepared for the European Commission, Publications Office of the 
European Union, Luxembourg.
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significant share of EU mobile citizens left their home coun-
try in order to look for or take up work that they found 
before moving (see figure above). Another important motive 
for moving abroad was family or personal reasons. 
A 2013 Eurobarometer survey sheds further light on the eco-
nomic rationale for moving (see figure on page 22). Half of 
the respondents stated that they would consider working in 
another member state for a better salary. Almost three out 
of ten named either their professional development and bet-
ter career opportunities or the inability to find a job in their 
home country as a reason to work abroad. While getting a 
better salary would have been a particular strong motiva-
tion for mobile EU citizens from CEE countries who have on 
average lower wages than those in older EU member states, 
EU nationals from crisis-ridden countries, particularly in 
Southern Europe, cited not being able to get a job as a main 
reason why they would consider working abroad. 
Recognition of qualifications is an essential 
factor to work abroad
Moving freely across borders is a fundamental right for EU 
citizens and is backed by substantial EU regulation prohib-
iting discrimination and intended barriers. Yet how easily 
can EU citizens take up work abroad and settle in? 
Practical hurdles to finding suitable work in another EU 
country include differences between national job markets, 
lack of language skills, problems with accessing social ben-
efits, the portability of old age pension rights or finding 
suitable housing. 
A decisive factor that helps mobile EU citizens to access a 
profession in another EU member state and to match their 
skills with a commensurate position and salary abroad is 
the successful recognition of their qualifications. In the 
EU, a large number of professions is regulated. This means 
that due to administrative, legislative or regulatory provi-
sions, access to these professions requires certain profes-
sional qualifications or titles.30 Seven professions (doctors, 
nurses, midwifes, dentists, veterinary surgeons, archi-
tects and pharmacists) are covered by harmonised min-
imum training conditions agreed upon at EU level and 
fall under the regime of “automatic recognition”. This 
however does not imply that recognition is indeed auto-
matic: EU citizens intending to work in one of these pro-
fessions in another EU country still need to apply to 
the competent authority in that member state in order to 
prove that their qualifications match the minimum train-
ing requirements.31 
30 EU directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications.
31 European Commission, Recognition of professional qualifications in  
practice.
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Overall, the number and kind of regulated professions dif-
fer largely across the EU: According to the regulated pro-
fessions database of the European Commission, they range 
from 77 in Lithuania to 543 in Hungary.32 The example of 
physiotherapists (who constitute the fourth most mobile 
profession across the EU) shows the variety of regulation 
types that exist across the EU: In several countries, physi-
otherapists have a protected title (for example in Germany 
and Sweden). In others, such as in Italy, some activities of 
physiotherapists are reserved to holders of a specific profes-
sional qualification. In another group of countries, including 
France and Belgium, both regulation types are combined. 
Moreover, while one profession might not be regulated in 
one country, it can be in another. As EU citizens intending 
to work in a regulated profession abroad are subject to reg-
ulations of the host country, different requirements across 
EU member states can make it more difficult for them to 
work abroad. If the applicant’s qualifications differ signif-
icantly from the ones required by the host country, appli-
cants can be asked to fulfil compensation measures, which 
can be an aptitude test or a period of supervised practice 
(“adaptation period”).33 
The regulation professions database nonetheless also shows 
that across the EU, a large majority of recognition deci-
sions are positive. However, it also reveals large differences 
between countries: Taking in account the period from 2014 
to 2018, 82 percent of recognition decisions in Germany 
were positive. 18 percent of decisions were neutral, which 
means that cases were still examined, underwent an adap-
tion period or an appeal. On the other side for example, only 
54 percent of decisions in Italy were positive but 34 were 
neutral and 12 percent negative. This means that access to 
the regulated profession has been refused. 
Untapped potential: Over-qualification 
among mobile EU citizens
Whether or not mobile EU citizens are able to translate 
their qualifications into an adequate job and salary com-
mensurate with their qualifications is a vital issue regard-
ing their participation in the labour market. Yet in particular 
32 European Commission, Regulated professions database, as of January 2019.
33 EU directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications.
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EU nationals from CEE countries often seem to not be able 
to match their qualifications with suitable positions or sala-
ries that are considered adequate in their destination coun-
try. According to the OECD as of 2014, more than half of ter-
tiary graduates among movers from Central and Eastern 
Europe worked in occupations that demand low or medium 
skill levels.34 In a similar vein, a report prepared for the 
European Commission suggests that EU nationals from 
member states that joined the EU since 2004 were more 
likely to feel over-qualified (37 percent) than those from 
older member states (27 percent) or the resident population 
(20 percent).35 
Zooming in: Young EU migrants in the UK
Such imbalances in matching qualification with commensurate 
job position and salary as seen above also hold true for young EU 
migrants from CEE countries that joined the EU between 2004 
and 2007. Researchers from Oxford University investigated the 
situation of young CEE migrants aged 20 to 34 in the UK between 
2010 and 2014 and found that their employment rate was 
higher than that of UK nationals in the same age group.36 Young 
migrants from CEE countries were more likely than locals to work 
in manufacturing (26.4 percent versus 9.1 percent). In particu-
lar, young Bulgarians and Romanians were more likely to work in 
construction compared to their UK peers (21 versus 7.6 percent) 
but also just as likely to work in financial services. 
The research showed that young EU nationals from CEE coun-
tries were less able to translate their qualifications into matching 
professions: 13 percent of them were over-qualified for the job 
they did, compared to about two percent of their UK peers and of 
Southern European nationals and one percent of those from the 
rest of the EU. The research also suggests that young migrants 
from CEE countries have the biggest problems in matching qual-
ifications with earnings: In gross hourly wages, they are on aver-
age paid a fifth less than their UK peers. On the other hand, 
34 OECD, EU, 2014, Matching economic migration with labour market needs in 
Europe.
35 Elena Fries-Tersch et al. 2017, 2016 Annual Report on intra-EU Labour 
Mobility, prepared for the European Commission, Publications Office of the 
European Union, Luxembourg.
36 Thees F. Spreckelsen and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, 2016, Hard Evidence: how 
integrated are young EU migrants into the UK workforce?; Thees F. Spreck-
elsen and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, 2016, Dimensions of labour market inte-
gration among young EU migrant citizens in the UK, Barnett Papers in 
Social Research, Oxford University.
young mobile citizens from Southern Europe receive wages sim-
ilar to their UK peers, and young movers from the rest of the EU 
(especially from France and Germany) have hourly wages that are 
on average more than 20 percent higher.
24
A lifetime of gender inequality in Europe
Inequalities between men and women constitute one of the 
most persistent social imbalances in the EU. Even though 
recent years have seen progress, reducing gender inequali-
ties in Europe remains an immense task: Women’s employ-
ment rates are lower than men’s; when women work, 
they earn less than men and they remain under-repre-
sented in political and economic decision-making. What 
is more, they carry the main burden of unpaid care activi-
ties for children or older family members. All these factors 
translate into a significant pension gap for elderly women, 
which limits their economic independence and exposes 
them to the risk of poverty in old age. 
Gender-based inequalities are often interlinked and accu-
mulate. This dossier therefore takes a lifetime perspective 
on gender inequality in Europe: first, we look at the educa-
tion choices of young women and, as their careers proceed, 
at female under-representation in economic and political 
decision-making. We then turn to the implications of par-
enthood on employment and conclude with the accumu-
lated income gap that translates into lower pensions for 
elderly women.
European women are under-represented in 
key economic sectors and decision-making 
positions
Women across Europe perform well in education. In 2016, 
57.6 percent of tertiary graduates in the EU were female.37 
Yet they are under-represented in booming and high-pay-
ing economic sectors such as information and commu-
nication technology (ICT) as well as in Science, Technol-
ogy, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM). In 2017, women 
represented 17.2 percent of ICT specialists in the EU.38 Even 
though women are closing the gap in the sciences and 
engineering sectors in the EU (of which they represented 
40 percent in 2016), they accounted for 45 percent of engi-
neers and scientists in the service sector but for less than 
20 percent of the same group in manufacturing.39 
37 Eurostat, 2018, Tertiary education statistics.
38 Eurostat, 2018, Girls and women under-represented in ICT. 
39 Eurostat, 2018, Women in Science and Technology. 
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Did you know that …
 … of 1,000 women with a university degree, only 24 graduate in ICT fields – and just six of them will actually start working in the 
digital sector? 
 … while the overall employment rate of women is 11.5 percentage points lower than men’s, the part-time proportion among 
women is, at 31.1 percent, almost four times as high as among men (8.1 percent)?
 … only about one in four board members of the largest listed companies across the EU are women and in most EU countries less 
than one in three national parliamentarians is female?
 … the average pension gap between women and men in the EU amounts to 37.2 percent? It ranges from 1.8 percent in Latvia to 
above 45 percent in the Netherlands and Cyprus.
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There is no single factor that explains such imbalances 
in education and the labour market. For young aspir-
ing women, factors such as gender stereotypes and social 
norms, inflexible working time arrangements and insuffi-
cient work-life balance provision as well as the lack of role 
models might influence their professional choices. Women 
already working in male-dominated sectors might drop out 
of those sectors in which they were initially educated and 
change their careers halfway through (the so-called “leaky 
pipeline syndrome”). What contributes to this are both 
informal as well as institutionalised barriers such as per-
Such disparities in the labour market strongly correlate 
with imbalances in education: As a study for the European 
Commission shows, out of 1,000 European women with a 
tertiary education, only 24 graduated in ICT fields – and 
only six of them would start working in the digital sec-
tor. In contrast, out of 1,000 men in the EU, 92 graduated 
in ICT-related fields – and 49 of them would take up a job 
in ICT after graduating.40 In contrast, women represent the 
majority of graduates in sectors that are traditionally less 
well-paid: four out of five graduates in the field of educa-
tion and three out of four graduates in health and welfare 
are female.41 
40 Carlota Tarín Quirós et al., 2018, Women in the Digital Age, study prepared 
for the European Commission, Publications Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg.
41 EIGE, 2018, Study and work in the EU: set apart by gender, Publications 
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
Representation: European women are underrepresented in political and economic decision-making
Share of women in national parliaments 
in the EU, in percent
Share of women on the boards of the largest listed 
companies in the EU, in percent
Note: Data accessed in January 2019; ordered by share of women in national parliaments in the EU. 
Sources: International Parliamentary Union; EIGE, Gender Statistics Database.
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sonnel and recruitment practices, future prospects, exclu-
sion from or limited access to informal networks.42 
The gender differences in education that translate into a 
segregated labour market are one factor contributing to the 
overall pay gap between men and women: In 2016, women 
across the EU still earned 16.2 percent less for each hour 
worked than men. The different career choices also mean 
that women will miss out on economic opportunities: The 
European Commission estimates that by 2020 half a million 
jobs will be vacant in the ICT sector alone.43
Apart from horizontal segregation of the labour market, 
there is also a vertical gender imbalance: Today, men still 
hold a majority of political and economic decision-mak-
ing positions in Europe. For example, in a majority of EU 
member states less than one in three national parliamen-
tarians is female. The differences across EU member states 
are significant: Whereas more than 40  percent of Swed-
ish and Finnish parliamentarians are women, less than 20 
percent in Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, Hungary and Malta are 
female (see figure on page 25). Women are also still largely 
under-represented in economic decision-making: accord-
ing to the European Institute for Gender Equality, women 
make up only about one in four board members in the larg-
est listed companies across the EU. While the female share 
of board members was below ten percent in Malta, Greece 
and Estonia, it reached 44 percent in France. 
Women bear main burden of juggling work 
and family life
In 2017, women’s employment rate across the EU was 
11.5  percentage points lower than men’s. Yet their part-
time rate is, at 31.1 percent, almost four times as high 
as for men (8.1 percent). One of the main reasons is that 
women still bear the lion’s share of unpaid care work. 
44 percent of women who worked part-time in 2017 did so 
because of family, personal or caring responsibilities. To 
42 Ibid.; EIGE, 2017, Work in the EU: women and men at opposite ends; Kon-
stantina Davaki, 2018, The underlying causes of the digital gender gap and 
possible solutions for enhanced digital inclusion of women and girls, study 
commissioned by the European Parliament.
43 European Commission, 2018, The top ICT skills in demand by companies 
today.
see the impact of the fact that women work less paid hours 
than men, it is important not only to consider the over-
all employment rate, but to also look at full-time equiv-
alent employment rates (see figure on page 27). Moreo-
ver, 31 percent of women who are not working nor actively 
seeking employment cited care obligations as the main rea-
son for their labour market inactivity, the highest score 
for more than 15  years. When it comes to parental leave, 
a recent Eurobarometer survey shows that 57 percent of 
women did take or consider taking it but only 32 percent 
of men. The gap is at its smallest in Sweden, where 73 per-
cent of men and 78 percent of women did take or consider 
taking parental leave, and largest in the Czech Republic 
(19 percent of men and 83 percent of women).44  
As mothers bear most care responsibilities, a lack of child-
care can have a significant impact on their labour mar-
ket participation. In 2002 the EU member states set them-
selves the target to “remove disincentives to female labour 
force participation and strive […] to provide childcare”45 
for at least 33  percent of children under three and for at 
least 90 percent of children between three years until man-
datory school age by 2010. As of then, only eight EU mem-
ber states managed to meet both the above objectives.46 
The situation has improved since then but large varia-
tions between member states remain. As of 2016, in nine 
EU countries – most of them newer member states – child-
care participation rates of children less than three years 
old were lower than twenty percent, in four of them (Slo-
vakia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Greece) even lower 
than ten percent. In several EU countries with weak child-
care provision, the employment rate of mothers with very 
young children is below average or even among the low-
est in the EU.
Zooming in: Motherhood and employment in the 
Czech Republic
At 76.3 percent, the employment rate of women between 20 and 
49 years in the Czech Republic exceeded the EU average by three 
percentage points in 2017. This is not the case for mothers with 
44 European Commission, 2018, Work-Life Balance, Flash Eurobarometer 470.
45 European Council, 2002, Presidency Conclusions, Barcelona European 
Council, 15/16 March 2002.
46 European Commission, 2013, Childcare: Commission calls on Member States 
to do more, Press Release.
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young children: the employment rate of mothers with a child under 
the age of six was, at 38.2 percent, 30 percentage points lower than 
the EU average (68 percent). By contrast, parenthood does not 
seem to have a negative impact on men’s participation in the Czech 
labour market: at 97.7 percent, the employment rate of fathers 
aged 20 to 49 years with a child under the age of six in the Czech 
Republic is the highest across the EU. 
What are the reasons behind such a strong gender gap in labour 
market participation of parents in the Czech Republic? First, the 
country experienced a massive closure of childcare facilities in 
the 1990s that went hand in hand with the rise of domestic child-
care performed largely by women.47 Care participation rates for 
Czech children under three were less than five percent in 2016, 
47 European Commission, Country profiles - Czech Republic: Policies and  
progress towards investing in children.
second only to Slovakia (0.5  percent). Women also constitute 
the main users of long parental leave entitlements: Accord- 
ing to the Eurobarometer survey cited above, 83 percent of 
Czech women – but only 19 percent of men – did take or consider 
taking such leave. 
Second, flexible work models that allow a better work-family 
balance as well as part-time employment are still rare in the 
Czech labour market: only eleven percent of women aged 
20 to 64  years worked part-time in 2017. Correspondingly, 
three out of four Czech women (25 to 49 years) mention fam-
ily or care responsibilities as the main reason for being inac-
tive – one of the highest rates in the EU. Even though women 
generally return to work after parental leave, the lack of 
(affordable) childcare and the low uptake of flexible work 
arrangements hinders parents’ ability to juggle work and care 
of young children, with mothers being more likely to be unem-
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49.8 percent less aggregate earnings than men of the same 
age group at the end of their careers.49 Earning differences, 
fragmented careers and bearing the main share of unpaid 
family care also make it much harder for a woman to build 
up adequate pension entitlements throughout her working 
life. The pension gap shows the difference in average pen-
sions for men and women. In 2016, pensions of women aged 
65 to 79 were on average 37.2 percent lower than men’s 
across the EU (see figure on page 29). The largest pen-
sion gaps exist in Cyprus (48.7 percent), the Netherlands 
(45.4 percent) and Malta (44.8 percent), and the smallest in 
Estonia (1.8 percent), Denmark (7.8 percent) and Slovakia 
(8.1 percent). In addition, one in five women in Europe aged 
49 Christina Boll et al., 2017, The gender lifetime earnings gap – exploring 
gendered pay from the life course perspective, HWWI Research Paper 179. 
The data used mainly covers women from West Germany.
ployed than childless women. Even though the European Com-
mission has noted some improvements, women with young 
children still constitute an especially vulnerable group on the 
Czech labour market.48
The consequences of accumulated gender 
inequalities in old age 
Inequalities in labour market participation and differ-
ences in earnings between men and women build up over 
a lifetime. For example, recent research shows that Ger-
man women born in the years 1950 to 1964 accumulated 
48 European Commission, 2017, Country Report Czech Republic 2017, Accom-
panying document, SWD (2017) 69 final.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Hungary
Estonia
Greece
Italy
Bulgaria
Malta
Finland
Poland
European Union
Germany
Romania
Latvia
Denmark
Cyprus
Spain
France
United Kingdom
Ireland
Austria
Belgium
Netherlands
Sweden
Slovenia
Lithuania
Croatia
Portugal
Luxembourg
Note: Age group 20 to 49 years. 
Sources: Eurostat, EU-LFS, author’s own calculations.
Employment gap between men and women with one young 
child under the age of six in 2017, in percentage points
Employment rate of women with one child under the 
age of six in 2017, in percent
67.9
60.0
79.6
71.4
70.0
67.6
43.1
78.9
83.8
40.5
56.0
61.0
54.6
38.2
76.2
70.5
57.9
79.2
67.1
70.4
67.7
77.3
69.0
78.6
73.9
80.8
73.5
71.2
n <40
n 40 – <50
n 50 – <60
n 60 – <70
n 70 – <80
n >80 European 
Union
68.0
Parenthood and employment: Different impacts on the labour market participation of men and women
29
A lifetime of gender inequality in Europe
65 or above is at risk of poverty or social exclusion. Again, 
this varies greatly across EU member states: While in the 
Netherlands, the proportion of men and women aged 65 
and above at risk of poverty or social exclusion was roughly 
equal at ten percent, the rate amounted to over 40 per-
cent of elder women in the Baltic countries and exceeded 50 
percent in Bulgaria. These countries also showed the big-
gest gaps between men and women aged 65 and above with 
regard to being at risk of poverty or social exclusion (14.3 
to 21.2 percentage points).50 Small(er) pensions might not 
only put elderly women at greater risk of poverty but also 
undermine their economic independence in old age, a pro-
cess that worsens with separation or widowhood.51 
50 European Commission, 2018, Pension Adequacy Report 2018, Publications 
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
51 EIGE, 2016, Poverty, gender and intersecting inequalities in the EU,  
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
Pensions: In most EU countries women receive much 
less than men 
Pension gap between men and women in 2016, in percent
Note: Data refers to pensioners aged 65 to 79 years.  
Source: European Commission,  
2018, Pension Adequacy Report.
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In 2010 EU governments set themselves the goal of lift-
ing at least 20 million people out of the risk of poverty or 
social exclusion by 2020.52 Until very recently, this goal was 
missed by a wide shot. In 2016 there were still more peo-
ple at risk of poverty than in the reference year 2008. Only 
in 2017 did the number of people at risk of poverty fall by 
about four million below the 2008 benchmark and even so 
more than one in five Europeans is still affected. 
A lot of monitoring is done to keep track of who is poor and 
why – but we spend less time understanding what it means 
to be poor. After a brief overview of how poverty devel-
oped in different member states during the economic crisis, 
we change track and take a look at some of the day-to-day 
problems of Europeans living at risk of poverty – such as 
being able to face unexpected expenses or to find afforda-
ble housing.
52 European Commission, 2010, Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth. 
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Poverty takes different shapes across the EU
Being at risk of poverty or social exclusion is the official 
measurement for poverty used by EU institutions. It means 
that a person is affected by at least one of the following 
three criteria: being at risk of poverty after social trans-
fers (welfare benefits), being severely materially deprived 
or living in a household with very low work intensity.53 At 
risk of poverty after social transfers, also known as income 
poverty, means living with less than 60 percent of the 
national median disposable income. Severely materially 
deprived means that a household is unable to afford four 
or more out of nine items of material subsistence, such as 
a decent meal every other day or the ability to cover unex-
pected financial expenses. The work intensity indicator 
counts all people aged under 60 living within a household 
whose working-age members together worked less than 
20  percent of their potential during the previous twelve 
months. 
53 Eurostat, 2018, People at risk of poverty or social exclusion.
Did you know that …
 … in 2017, 113 million Europeans lived at the risk of poverty or social exclusion, representing 22.5 percent of the  
EU’s population?
 … between 2008 and 2017, at-risk-of-poverty rates rose in eleven EU countries, including in Italy, Spain, the Netherlands,  
and Sweden?
 … more than one in five Europeans faced either difficulty or great difficulty in making ends meet in 2017?
 … 34 percent of Europeans said they were unable to face unexpected expenses such as repairing a broken washing machine?
 … 38 percent of households at risk of poverty were affected by disproportionate housing costs in 2017  
(accounting for more than 40 percent of their disposable income)? By contrast, among households not at risk of poverty only 
five percent were affected.
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Given the vast disparities in living standards, welfare state 
traditions and levels of inequality, poverty takes very dif-
ferent shapes across Europe. These differences can be illus-
trated by comparing the first two measures: being at risk of 
income poverty and severe material deprivation. 
The figure above shows the extent of poverty and social 
exclusion across member states and the change in income 
poverty and severe material deprivation since 2008: Dur-
ing the financial and economic crisis, both measures went 
up across Europe. While the average level of material dep-
rivation has been constantly in decline since 2012, the risk 
of income poverty continued to increase slowly until 2017 
despite the economic recovery. 
The overall trend masks wide differences between member 
states across Europe, particularly for material deprivation: 
In Sweden, for example, severe material deprivation stands 
at a mere 0.8 percent, while in Bulgaria 30 percent of the 
population are affected. Looking at changes over time, 
only a few countries such as Latvia and Poland were able to 
improve on both measures compared to 2008. In crisis-rid-
den countries such as Spain and Italy, both income poverty 
and deprivation deteriorated compared to pre-crisis lev-
els. Greece stands out as the only country where depriva-
tion went up significantly without substantial changes in 
income poverty, meaning that large parts of society suf-
fered income losses during the crisis. 
The reality of material and  
social deprivation
Material deprivation is generally on the decline in Europe 
and affects much fewer people than income poverty. In 
fact, it is the one measure of poverty that has been declin-
ing most rapidly across Europe, thanks to double-digit 
reductions in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. Nevertheless, 
the bar for being considered severely materially deprived 
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is also quite high: being unable to afford four out of nine 
basic items of material subsistence. This nine-item list 
monitored under the Europe 2020 strategy asks whether 
a person can afford to pay their rent, mortgage or utility 
bills; keep their home adequately heated; face unexpected 
expenses; eat meat or proteins regularly; go on holiday; or 
own a television set, washing machine, car and telephone.
Affording annual holidays is not on the cards for most 
Europeans at risk of poverty (see figure). What is strik-
ing is that in 2017 as many as 25 percent of Europeans 
unaffected by poverty were still unable to afford a one-
week vacation. This was particularly the case in CEE and 
Southern European countries: in Romania almost 60 per-
cent of those not considered at risk of poverty were un- 
able to go on vacation. Research suggests that this is also 
the first item that households would curtail if under eco-
nomic strain.54
The inability to face unexpected financial expenses such 
as replacing a broken washing machine is the most wide-
spread measure of deprivation and highlights the vulnera-
bility of many low-income households. It is also a measure 
that has declined little over recent years. Almost 70  per-
cent of households at risk of poverty are vulnerable to 
unexpected expenses. Even in rich countries such as Swe-
den every second poor household is affected. Again, single 
households face the greatest difficulties in covering unex-
pected expenses.  
54 Joseph Deutsch et al., 2015, Material Deprivation in Europe: Which  
Expenditures are Curtailed First? Social Indicator Research 120(3). 
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Zooming in: Poverty and the loss of social networks 
Many poor households struggle to make ends meet with their 
available income: Across the EU, more than one in five Europe-
ans has difficulties or great difficulties in paying their bills and 
meeting daily expenses. This proportion rises to one in two at risk 
of poverty. What is more, research suggests that households at 
risk of poverty are also more likely to lose the social network of 
friends and family that could partly compensate for their lack of 
material resources.
Data from Eurofound’s 2016 European Quality of Life Survey 
shows elevated risks of social exclusion for the quarter of the pop-
ulation with the lowest incomes. Social exclusion means that people 
feel that they are left out or that other people look down on them.55 
Research by Petra Böhnke from the University of Hamburg found 
that, across the EU, people in the lowest income quartile are also 
much less likely to be able to rely on social support from friends and 
families such as asking for help when having financial difficulties or 
having somebody to talk to about personal matters.56
Yet, there are differences across member states, depending on 
welfare state traditions and cultural factors: Recourse to the fam-
ily generally decreases among people at risk of poverty, particu-
larly in Scandinavia, the Baltic countries and some continental 
member states such as Belgium or France. In Southern European 
countries, by contrast, people are more likely to turn to their fam-
ily in case of financial hardship.
The struggle to find affordable housing 
High housing costs can be a burden on household finances: 
Factoring in housing costs significantly pushes up the 
average proportion of Europeans at risk of poverty – from 
16.9 to 31.1 percent in 2017. In ten EU member states the 
poverty risk more than doubles when housing costs are 
taken into account: among these are both rich countries 
such as Denmark, Germany and the UK and poorer ones 
such as Hungary and Greece.57 
55 Eurofound, 2017, European Quality of Life Survey 2016: Quality of life,  
quality of public services, and quality of society.
56 Petra Böhnke, 2008, Are the poor socially integrated? The link between 
poverty and social support in different welfare regimes, Journal of European 
Social Policy 18(2).
57 Eurostat, 2018, Living conditions in Europe – 2018 edition. Numbers 
updated to 2017.
In 2017, ten percent of EU households spent more than 
40 percent of their disposable income on housing costs, 
which is defined as housing cost overburden. While the 
rate remained relatively constant for Europe’s population 
at large, it rose from around 35 percent in 2009 to about 
40 percent in 2014 for households already at risk of poverty. 
Over the same period, housing cost overburden also spread 
among young people, who were generally hit harder by the 
economic downturn. 
High rates of housing cost overburden can have differ-
ent reasons. The two countries with the highest rates are: 
Greece with 40 percent and Bulgaria with 19 percent. In 
both countries these rates seem related to the economic 
crisis, as they rose strongly after 2010. Denmark (16 per-
cent) and Germany (15 percent) follow in places three 
and four. In Denmark and Germany the high rates can be 
explained by the proportion of renters versus homeown-
ers: Across the EU, 25 percent of tenants renting at market 
Housing cost overburden: Young and poor households 
are disproportionately affected
Housing cost overburden in the EU among selected 
income and age groups, in percent
Note: The housing cost overburden rate is the percentage of the  
population living in households where the total housing costs account  
for more than 40 percent of the disposable income.  
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC survey. 
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prices face overburden while this is only the case for 
4.6 percent of homeowners with mortgages.58 In both Den-
mark and Germany, the share of tenants paying rent at 
market prices is among the highest in Europe, while that of 
homeowners is relatively low compared to the EU average. 
Although housing cost overburden is on a downward trend 
in the EU, the problem is very pressing in some countries 
and for specific groups such as people with low incomes 
renting at market prices in urban areas.  
58 Eurostat, 2018, Living conditions in Europe. 2018 edition, Publications 
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
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Barriers to healthcare access in Europe 
Having access to affordable and good quality health-
care is essential to people’s quality of life. However, bar-
riers to healthcare can significantly increase social imbal-
ances, in particular for already vulnerable groups such as 
low-income households, the unemployed or people living 
in remote areas.
This dossier focusses on three areas of potential barriers 
to accessing healthcare in Europe: First, we examine how 
income levels may influence the ability to afford healthcare 
and look in particular at out-of-pocket payments. Second, 
we look at coverage for healthcare across Europe and zoom 
in on the situation in Greece during the financial crisis. 
Third, we shed light on how regional imbalances in health-
care provision might affect Europeans’ access to care.
Lower income groups face greater 
difficulties in affording healthcare
In 2017, seven in ten Europeans thought of themselves as 
being in very good or good health. While this was true for 
80.4 percent of the top income quintile (the 20 percent of 
the population with the highest income), it only held up for 
61.2 percent in the lowest quintile. 
A similar difference is observable with regard to health-
care access: The overall proportion of Europeans report-
ing unmet healthcare needs is generally low and has 
declined over recent years. However, low-income house-
holds are still much more likely to report they are unable 
to meet healthcare needs. One factor that adds to such dis-
parities is affordability: Four out of ten households earning 
below 60 percent of median equivalised income reported 
some, moderate or great difficulties in affording health-
care in 2016, compared to almost three in ten households of 
the EU total. Such findings show that income levels matter 
for healthcare access – and in some EU countries more 
than in others: While less than five percent of low-in-
come households in the UK, Finland and Denmark face 
great difficulties in affording healthcare, this concerns 
more than 20 percent of the same group in Ireland, Latvia, 
Belgium, Hungary, Slovakia and Cyprus – and more than 
half of low-income households in Greece. Country differ-
ences also show up in Eurostat data on unmet health care 
Barriers to healthcare access in Europe 
Did you know that …
 … seven out of ten Europeans perceived themselves to be in very good or good health in 2017? This holds for 80.4 percent of  
EU citizens with high incomes but for just 61.2 percent of Europeans on low incomes?
 … more than half of low-income households in Greece face great difficulties in affording healthcare? In another six EU countries, 
this also concerns more than 20 percent of the same group.
 … more than 2.5 million or a quarter of the Greek population lost their health insurance coverage during the economic crisis?
 … out-of-pocket costs for healthcare range from as low as ten percent in France to 45 percent in Latvia and Cyprus  
and 48 percent in Bulgaria?
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needs: In 2017, an estimated 2.3 percent of Europeans in 
the lowest income quintile reported that they were una-
ble to undergo medical examination because they could not 
pay for it. However, this figure was as high as 9.9 percent 
for Latvia and 16.4 percent in Greece. In the case of Greece, 
this share has been above 10 percent since 2011 and peaked 
at 34.3  percent in 2016. For Latvia, more than 20 percent 
of the lowest income quintile consistently reported unmet 
needs between 2010 and 2014. 
How high out-of-pocket costs constitute  
a barrier to healthcare
An essential factor behind healthcare affordability is the 
scale of out-of-pocket costs. These are health expenditures 
(for example on medicine) not fully covered by public or 
private insurance that have to be borne by patients them-
selves. According to the OECD, out-of-pocket costs consti-
Unmet healthcare needs: Lower income groups are disproportionately affected  
Note: By income quintile, age group 16 years or over. 
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC survey.
n Total l Bottom quintile l Top quintile
tute roughly a fifth of health spending across EU countries 
(see figure on page 37). This proportion can be as low as 
ten percent in France but reach over 40 percent in Latvia, 
Cyprus (both 45 percent) and Bulgaria (48 percent).  
The Latvian example shows how such high out-of-pocket 
payments can constitute an essential barrier to health-
care: Healthcare providers in Latvia are given annual quotas 
for services that will be covered by the national health ser-
vice. Once those quotas are reached, patients need either to 
wait until the following year or pay for the services them-
selves. The impact is particularly heavy on the poorest 
income quintile: In 2013, more than one in four households 
in this income group faced “catastrophic” out-of-pocket 
costs. These are medical costs that exceed 40 percent of 
total household consumption spending after subtract-
ing spending on subsistence needs such as food, housing 
Self-reported unmet needs for medical examination due to being too expensive, 2017, in percent
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Healthcare costs: Out-of-pocket payments for 
healthcare vary significantly across the EU
Source: OECD Health  
Statistics 2018.
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long-term treatment might pose too much of a financial 
burden upon households, which can not only limit one’s 
access to healthcare but also increase poverty.61 
Coverage for healthcare in Europe is high, 
but gaps persist 
The comprehensiveness of health insurance coverage 
can indicate the level of financial protection provided by 
the system. Key to assessing coverage is: who is covered, 
what health services are included and what proportion of 
the costs is covered. Most EU countries provide univer-
sal healthcare coverage for a basket of core services. Across 
EU member states, public coverage is generally less exten-
sive for pharmaceuticals or dental care than for outpatient 
care and inpatient care, which is the most comprehensively 
covered type of care in the EU.62 Yet, significant differences 
with regard to service and cost coverage remain among EU 
members. 
More than ten percent of the population are not covered 
even for a core set of services in Cyprus, Romania and Bul-
garia. In another five countries, this concerns five to ten 
percent of the population (Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Slo-
vakia, Hungary).63 What might explain such gaps to some 
extend is, for example, a relatively high number of peo-
ple working abroad (such as in Bulgaria or Romania) or 
for international institutions that have other insurance 
regimes (such as in Luxembourg). In the case of Roma-
nia, data also shows that coverage is much higher in urban 
areas (94.9 percent) than in rural areas (75.8 percent). This 
gap might partially be explained by the fact that among 
those not contributing to health funds and hence unin-
sured are, amongst others, agricultural workers. But it also 
concerns the self-employed, unemployed unregistered for 
benefits as well as Roma without identity cards.64 A signifi-
cant share of Roma is also not covered by insurance in Bul-
garia. Here, citizens can lose health insurance if they fail to 
pay three monthly contributions within three years. This 
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 OECD, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2017, Roma-
nia: Country Health Profile 2017, State of Health in the EU, OECD Publish-
ing, Paris, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, Brussels.
and utilities.59 The extent of “catastrophic” out-of-pocket 
spending on healthcare varies across EU countries: It affects 
less than two percent of households in Slovenia, Ireland, the 
UK, Sweden and France, but over eight percent in Latvia, 
Hungary, Portugal, Greece, Lithuania and Poland.60 
The share of out-of-pocket costs within total health 
spending also mirrors how far the use of healthcare is 
financially protected in an individual country. If such pro-
tection is insufficient or absent, falling sick or requiring 
59 OECD, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2017, Latvia:  
Country Health Profile 2017, State of Health in the EU, OECD Publishing,  
Paris, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, Brussels; 
Maris Taube et al., 2017, Financial protection in high-income countries:  
a comparison of the Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia, Report prepared  
by the WHO Regional Office in Europe, World Health Organization. 
60 OECD, EU, 2018, Health at a Glance: Europe 2018: State of Health in the EU 
Cycle, OECD Publishing, Paris.
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in particular affects vulnerable groups like the long-term 
unemployed or the poor.65 In several EU countries, some 
groups are not mandatorily covered. These can include 
some people in non-standard employment and precar-
ious jobs, certain categories of self-employed or people 
who have not yet contributed a minimum number of years, 
including young people entering the labour market.66  
Zooming in: Coverage for healthcare during the 
economic crisis in Greece 
The Greek healthcare system was hit hard by the economic cri-
sis. Between 2003 and 2009, real per capita health spending in 
Greece saw bigger increases than on average across the EU. But 
between 2009 to 2013 it contracted by on average 8.7 percent 
per year.67 As health coverage in Greece used to be mainly linked 
to employment status, the strong increase in unemployment 
during the crisis caused more than 2.5 million or almost a quar-
ter of the Greek population to lose their health insurance cover-
age, including for their dependents. As of 2015, 14 percent of the 
population were still not covered. The loss of eligibility and cov-
erage might have contributed to the reported high rates of unmet 
need in Greece. After earlier failures, since 2016 legislation in 
Greece aims at ensuring that even those who became uninsured 
through losing their job or are unable to pay contributions can 
access a health benefits package.68
Regional disparities in healthcare  
provision 
Being able to visit a doctor not too far from one’s home 
is essential for good access to healthcare. According to 
the OECD, the number of doctors per capita has increased 
65 OECD, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2017,  
Bulgaria: Country Health Profile 2017, State of Health in the EU, OECD  
Publishing, Paris, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 
Brussels.
66 Rita Baeten et al., 2018, Inequalities in access to healthcare, a study  
of national policies, study prepared for the European Commission,  
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
67 OECD, EU, 2018, Health at a Glance: Europe 2018: State of Health in the  
EU Cycle, OECD Publishing, Paris.
68 OECD, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2017,  
Greece: Country Health Profile 2017, State of Health in the EU, OECD  
Publishing, Paris, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 
Brussels; OECD, European Union, 2016, Health at a Glance: Europe 2016, 
State of Health in the EU Cycle, OECD Publishing, Paris.
across all EU countries since 2000, but significant varia-
tions between and within member states remain.69 As med-
ical personnel tends to cluster in bigger cities or capital 
regions, remote, rural but also deprived and socio-econom-
ically disadvantaged regions or those with poor infrastruc-
ture face challenges in providing full healthcare coverage. 
Factors contributing to challenges in healthcare provision 
in rural or remote areas include a limited transport infra-
structure and longer distances or travel time to see a doc-
tor. The low population density of rural areas also makes it 
harder to efficiently locate medical specialist services, pro-
vide an adequate mix of specialists and general practition-
ers or around-the-clock medical care.70
The example of the Île-de-France region in France shows 
how regional imbalances are not only limited to rural or 
remote areas, but can also affect socio-economically disad-
vantaged metropolitan areas. The most populous of French 
regions, which also includes Paris, shows a significant dis-
parity in the density of generalist services at local level: 
While Paris has among the highest density of general prac-
titioners across France, the neighbouring, socio-econom-
ically disadvantaged area of Seine-Saint-Denis ranks sec-
ond-lowest among all French local units (départements) 
measured.71 Similar disparities are visible with regard to 
specialists and dentists.  
Moreover, as of 2016, 38 percent of doctors in the EU were 
aged 55 years or above, a proportion that reached as high as 
54 percent in Italy. As these doctors approach retirement, 
this might put additional pressure on areas already fac-
ing difficulties in ensuring that their citizens have adequate 
access to health services. 
69 OECD, EU, 2018, Health at a Glance: Europe 2018: State of Health in the  
EU Cycle, OECD Publishing, Paris.
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we prepared to accept – and where do we want more con-
vergence in living and working conditions? Is coordination 
enough or do we need binding rules to promote upward 
convergence? How much solidarity do we want (and per-
haps need) across borders – in good times and bad? Finally, 
which common public goods should Europe provide in the 
field of social policy? 
Finding answers to these questions will guide our future 
research. And we hope that they will also be discussed by 
national and European politicians when they table their 
visions and ideas for Europe in the upcoming European 
elections this year.
Conclusion
The main question – and title – of this report is: How 
are you doing, Europe? There is no single answer to this: 
Whether Europeans are doing better or worse in their daily 
lives is linked to the country or region they live in, their 
socio-economic group, and the precise aspect of living and 
working conditions under examination. With its six closely 
defined dossiers, this report can only shed light on selected 
issues of Europe’s social fabric. Examples in each of the 
dossiers emphasize perspectives that we found under-re-
ported and worth highlighting. 
Yet there are a number of conclusions we can draw: First, 
Europe faces common social challenges. All of the six chal-
lenges we covered were applicable to more than a few 
member states. We saw that even in richer EU countries 
there is ample room to improve social conditions. Sec-
ond, many challenges seem structural rather than cycli-
cal. Europe has just emerged from a deep crisis and many 
indicators reflect that recovery. Yet there are many social 
imbalances that are persistent and concentrated within 
specific socio-economic groups. 
Finally, the key message for policy makers is that we need 
better social policy in Europe. Several socio-economic 
groups lack adequate social protection or the opportunity to 
make use of their potential on the labour market. The ques-
tion now is: Does the EU need to provide more comprehen-
sive social policy?
Debating Europe’s role in social policy brings to the table a 
whole set of related important questions: Where are com-
mon solutions desirable and where should we rather adopt 
those tailored to national or local conditions? And what are 
the proper tools to promote European social policy? How 
much disparity within and among EU member states are 
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